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Abstract According to Meinongianism, some objects do not exist but we can legiti-
mately refer to and quantify over them. Moreover, Meinongianism standardly regards
nonexistent objects as contributing to the truth-makers of sentences about nonexistent
objects. Recently, Tim Crane has proposed a weak form of Meinongianism, a reduc-
tionism, which denies any contribution of nonexistent objects to truth-making. His
reductionism claims that, even though we can truly talk about nonexistent objects by
using singular terms and quantifiers about them, any truth about nonexistent objects is
reducible to some truths about existent objects. In this paper, we critically examine the
reductionism casting some doubts on the reducibility of truths of sentences like ‘a
winged pig is possible’ or ‘some winged pig does not exist’ into truths about existent
objects. We also argue that the truth of such sentences can be explained by adopting a
strong form of Meinongianism which admits contribution of nonexistent objects to the
truth-making of such sentences.
Keywords Nonexistent objects . Truth-maker . Meinongianism . Possible objects .
Reductionism
1. Nonexistent Objects and Truth-Making
Meinongianism is understood as Bthe view that some objects do not exist, but we can
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2013b, p. 115). Given this definition, Meinongianism covers any philosophical position
which endorses the following two ideas:
[1] Some objects do not exist.
[2] We can refer to and quantify over nonexistent objects to make true statements
about them.
In addition to these, contemporary Meinongians standardly hold the following third
(maybe implicit) assumption:
[3] Nonexistent objects are (or, at least, are parts of) the truth-makers of sentences
which contain reference to or/and quantification over nonexistent objects.
As Azzouni claims: BContemporary Meinongians think that nonexistent objects
have properties. They also think that how nonexistent objects are (what properties they
have) are the truth-makers for sentences about those objects^ (Azzouni 2012, p.254).
For Meinongians, the so-called characterization principle (CP) guarantees the first point
of the quotation, that is, the possession of properties by nonexistent objects. The
version originally proposed by Meinong (1904) is called naïve CP and it claims that,
for any characterization (any set of properties), some object which satisfies the char-
acterization is in the domain of discourse. However, this version was vulnerable to
Russell’s objections (cf. Russell 1905, pp.482–483) and it was quickly dismissed.
Consequently, nowadays, there are three revised versions of CP. Some Meinongians
(cf. Parsons 1980; Routley 1980) claim that, distinguishing the so-called ‘nuclear’ and
‘extra-nuclear’ properties,1 CP must be applied to characterizations which contain only
nuclear properties. Some other Meinongians (cf. Zalta 1988) claim that there are two
different ways of having properties: encoding and exemplifying. According to them, a
nonexistent object encodes all the properties it is characterized as having but does not
exemplify them. Finally, another group of Meinongians (cf. Priest 2005; Berto 2013a,
Chap. 6.3) claims that an object has all the properties it is characterized as having not
necessarily in the actual world but in some possible or impossible worlds. Even though
these three versions of CP differ in details, it is certain that all of them ensure that
nonexistent objects have properties (in some ways). And contemporary Meinongians
like Parsons, Routley, Zalta and Priest seem to take the property-possession of nonex-
istent objects as contributing to truth-making of sentences about nonexistent objects.
For example, even if a is a nonexistent object, if a has the property P, then, the sentence
‘a is P′ is true simply because of a’s possession of P. In this way, nonexistent objects
can be involved in truth-making of sentences about them. Moreover, Meinongianism
accepts that a nonexistent object can have properties which are not parts of its
characterization. For example, some nonexistent objects instantiate such properties as
being incomplete, being possible, being thought of by someone, and so on. Because of
this, according to these contemporary Meinongians, nonexistent objects can be in-
volved in the truth-makers of sentences such as ‘Sherlock Holmes is possible’ and so
on.
1 For more details about the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties, see Parsons (1980,
pp.17–22; pp.166–174).
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Let us call a position which endorses [1], [2] and [3] strong Meinongianism. Many
contemporary Meinongians seem to endorse strong Meinongianism. However, recently
Tim Crane (Crane 2013) has introduced a new form of Meinongianism (let us call it
weak Meinongianism), which endorses [1] and [2] but rejects [3]. He proposes a
reductionist2 account of nonexistent objects which claims that, even though both [1]
and [2] hold, truths of singular and/or quantificational sentences about nonexistent
objects are reducibly explained by truths about existent objects. According to him,
Bsome objects of thought exist and some do not^ (Crane 2013, p.38, henceforth all page
references are from Crane 2013 unless otherwise noted). Moreover, he also claims:
not only can we talk about them [nonexistent objects] by using names but we can
also talk about them by using quantifiers – for instance, expressions which pick out
or specify a quantity of things, such as ‘some’, ‘all’, ‘most’, ‘many’ and so on (p.16).
Sentences like ‘Pegasus is a mythical horse’ (p. 23) or ‘some biblical characters did
not exist’ (p. 40) not only are true but also contain reference to and/or quantification
over nonexistent objects.3 However, his reductionism claims that no nonexistent object
is involved in the truth-making of such true singular/quantificational sentences about
nonexistent objects. Truths about nonexistent objects are reduced to truths of existent
objects. Let us see his reductionism in more detail.4
According to Crane, both singular and quantificational sentences receive the fol-
lowing standard semantic analysis, no matter whether they are about existent objects or
nonexistent objects (pp. 37–42).
(1) ‘a is F′ is true iff a has the property F.
(2) ‘Some F is G’ is true iff for some object, it has the property F and the property G.
For example, ‘Pegasus is a mythical horse’ is true iff Pegasus has the property of being a
mythical horse. ‘Some biblical character does not exist’ is true iff for some object x, x is a
biblical character and does not exist, in the sameway as ‘some pig is pink’ is true iff for some
object x, x is a pig and pink. In this way, Crane’s reductionism admits that nonexistent
objects have properties. However, reductionism claims that there is a significant limitation
on what kind of properties nonexistent objects can have. They can have only pleonastic
properties and they cannot have any substantial property (wewill see the definitions of these
two kinds of properties soon below). A property is substantial if it Bconstitute[s] the nature of
2 The anonymous referee has suggested that this terminology is not explanatory enough because it leaves open
the problem about what exactly is being reduced. Thus, the referee has suggested another terminology, namely
ersatz noneism. Even though we agree on the possibility of having more explanatory way of labeling Crane’s
position, we prefer to stick on the one used by Crane himself.
3 Crane insists on using the term ‘reference’ for the relationship between a name and an existent object. If the
object does not exist, the name is simply ‘about’ its object, and does not refer to it (cf. p.9). In this paper we
use the term ‘reference’ as follows. When one talks about an object by using a singular term, then the
expression refers to the object. In our terminology, Crane admits reference to nonexistent objects.
4 Someone might worry that, even though our arguments presuppose a conception of truth-maker, some
philosophers reject this conception. Of course, discussing about the validity of truth-making is an important
issue but it does not concern the primary aim of this paper. It is important to underline that, as in the case of
Crane’s reductionism (cf. p. 119), our usage of truth-making is not committed to any specific account of truth-
making but is a naive and general notion of it.
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existing things, which is open to investigation, and whose instantiation depends on more
than their merely being represented^ (p. 70). Introducing the notion of pleonastic property,
he focuses on the idea that having a pleonastic property is always reducible to facts that are
constituted by instantiation of substantial properties. The possession of a pleonastic property,
F, by an object, a, depends on the truth of the sentence ‘a is F′, not vice versa. And the truth
of the sentence is ultimately explained not by a’s instantiation of F, rather by some existent
object’s/objects’ having some substantial property/properties, even if a is a nonexistent
object (cf. p. 75). In this way, no nonexistent objects can be involved in truth-making, even
for sentences about nonexistent objects. Pleonastic properties are not, so to speak, genuine
properties: they do not have the power of truth-making. According to him, reality is
constituted by only existent objects and substantial properties. Truths about both existent
and nonexistent objects are explained exhaustively by reality in this sense.
Then, what properties are counted as pleonastic? According to Crane, almost all
pleonastic properties are representation-dependent. The only exceptions are Bthe prop-
erty of being non-existent, and logical properties like self-identity^ (p. 69).
Representation-dependent properties are Bproperties which depend upon the fact that
the object is being represented in some way: in thought, language, picture, and so on^
(p. 68). One of Crane’s examples is the property of being represented as having P,
where P is a substantial property (p. 70). For example, Holmes has the property of
being represented as a detective. Crane also regards the properties of being fictional
and being mythical as examples of representation-dependent properties (p. 68).
In order to clarify the notion of pleonastic property and its relation to truth, let us
discuss these examples in more details. ‘Holmes is represented as a detective’ is true.
The truth-maker of this sentence consists in the actual activities of existent objects in the
world, that is, the mental activities of Conan Doyle or any other reader of his novels.
There is no contribution of the pleonastic property of being represented as a detective
and the nonexistent object Sherlock Holmes to its truth. Contrary, in virtue of the truth of
the sentence, Holmes has the pleonastic property of being represented as a detective.
Sherlock Holmes instantiates also many other representation-dependent properties. For
example, he instantiates the property of being fictional. However, the fact that Holmes
has the property of being fictional is not the truth-maker of the sentence ‘Holmes is
fictional’. Indeed, once again, this sentence is true because of an appropriate kind of
representational activities by human beings such as Conan Doyle and the readers of his
novels, which involves only existent objects and their instantiation of substantial
properties. And only because of the truth of the sentence, Holmes has the pleonastic
property of being fictional. In other words, the truth of the sentence ‘Holmes is fictional’
makes Holmes to instantiate the property of being fictional, not vice versa. At the
beginning of section 2, we will give more explanation of pleonastic properties.
It is also worth noting that, even though Crane rejects CP, his weak Meinongianism
is compatible with some versions of CP. In particular, reductionism is compatible with
the following restricted version of CP. For any substantial property P, let us call the
property of being represented as having P the pleonastic counterpart of P. Then, we can
define a version of CP as saying that for any set of substantial properties, some object
has all the pleonastic counterparts of the properties in the set.
So far we have confirmedwhat Crane’s reductionism, a version of weakMeinongianism,
claims. Nevertheless, one question still remains open: is this version of weak
Meinongianism better than the strong one? In what follows, we point out some defects of
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this reductionism. In particular, we claim that not all properties of nonexistent objects are
reducible to reality in Crane’s sense (section 2.1) and that reductionism does not adequately
explain the semantic behaviors of quantifiers ranging over nonexistent objects (section 2.2).
2. Some Problems of Reductionism
2.1 Is Possibility a Pleonastic Property?
The crucial claim of reductionism is whether any instantiation of a property by a
nonexistent object is reducible to some instantiations of properties by existent objects.
As we have seen, according to Crane, properties that nonexistent objects can have are
representation-dependent properties, the property of being nonexistent or logical prop-
erties such as being self-identical. Crane claims that B[t]he representations on which
these properties [representation-dependent properties] depend are part of reality, to be
sure. So the task ahead of us is to explain the problematic truths about the nonexistent
in terms of truth about these representations^ (p. 120). This is not a trivial task, and
Crane puts significant efforts to give some examples of such reduction (pp. 133–136).
Concerning the property of being nonexistent, assuming that the singular negative
existential sentence ‘a does not exist’ predicates the pleonastic property of being
nonexistent to a, Crane claims that ‘a does not exist’ is true iff ‘a exists’ is false.
And ‘a exists’ is made false, if it is, by the whole world (pp. 74–75). The truth-maker of
a singular negative existential statement is the whole world, the way the existent objects
actually are (p. 75). For self-identity, Crane claims that, no matter whether a is existent
or not, identity statements of the form ‘a = a’ are true, because they are instances of the
logical truth that for all x, x = x (pp. 162–167). However, these properties do not
exhaust the properties that nonexistent objects can have, and this leads to a major
problem for his reductionism. Let us discuss it.
Consider the property of being possible.5 Consider a winged pig. Since the proper-
ties which a winged pig instantiates are logically consistent, a winged pig is logically
possible, even though it does not exist. Nevertheless, because a winged pig is possible
regardless whether it is represented or not, the property of being possible is not
representation-dependent.6 Of course, such a property is neither the property of being
nonexistent nor logical properties like self-identity. Therefore, being possible is a
5 We interpret the property of being possible as the property of being classically possible. An object is
classically possible iff it does not violate classical logic, in particular, if the set of all properties of the object is
consistent.
6 The anonymous referee has suggested that, if someone takes possibility as conceivability (let us call this
conceivability-possibility thesis), this claim might be contentious. First of all, there are influential debates
about this conceivability-possibility thesis. For some arguments against this thesis, see Hill and Mclaughlin
(1999) and Soames (2005, p.196-209). Secondly, even if possibility is wrapped up with conceivability, it does
not necessarily follow that the property of being possible is representation-dependent: it depends on how
representation-dependency is understood. According to one understanding (à la Crane), the property of being
possible is representation-dependent iff any object has it only relative to some actual representation which is
given by some cognitive agent. However, according to conceivability-possibility thesis, x’s being F is possible
if it is not eliminated by a priori consideration for x to be F and the antecedent of this conditional does not
entail that x is actually represented by someone. Proponents of conceivability-possibility thesis can accept that
something is possible without being represented by anyone.
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property of nonexistent objects which is neither representation-dependent, nonexis-
tence, nor a logical property. Crane’s trichotomy of properties of nonexistent objects is
wrong. Crane would reply to this objection that possibility is indeed representation-
dependent, by claiming as follows: nonexistent objects cannot have substantial prop-
erties like the property of being a pig. A winged pig is possible not because the
properties it instantiates are consistent, but because it is represented as having consis-
tent properties. However, there are two objections against the representation-
dependency of possibility of objects. First of all, some possible nonexistent objects
have never been thought. Consider a winged pig which has 115 tails and speaks Italian,
Japanese, and English fluently. This is a possible object. Let us suppose one of the
authors of this paper, for the first time in the whole of human history, thought about it
on the 28th of May 2015. Although there was no representation of it, it was a possible
object even before then. The modal property of the pig did not depend on representa-
tions. If so, there is no reason to reject that some nonexistent objects are now possible
independently from any representations of them. Secondly, not only nonexistent but
also existent objects can be possible. For example, the Empire State Building is a
possible object. It is possible independently whether it is represented or not. It is
possible simply because its properties are consistent (assuming that the actual world
is consistent). One may claim that there are two different properties of being possible:
one is substantial and the other is pleonastic. The Colosseum is substantially possible,
but a winged pig is only pleonastically possible. We are not sure whether this move is
promising or not. It seems possible to claim that this is an ad hoc supposition to
maintain the view that nonexistent objects can only have pleonastic properties.7 And
more importantly, this distinction will not dissolve the problem of reducibility.
A reductionist may accept that the property of being possible is a forth kind of
pleonastic property so as to abandon Crane’s trichotomy. Now, given that reductionism
is the universal claim that all true statements about nonexistent objects are reductively
explained by appealing only to reality (in Crane’s sense), it is crucial for reductionism
to show that true sentences which predicate the property of being possible to a
nonexistent object are reductively explained as well. However, we are skeptical about
the reducibility of the property of being possible. At least, it is not an easy task. Let us
show this by trying to do the task for Crane.
Taking ‘a winged pig is possible’ to be equivalent with ‘some existent object is such
that it is possible to be a winged pig’, a reductionist may claim that the truth of the
former is reductively explained by the truth-maker of the latter. There are two different
accounts for the truth of such modal statements about existent objects. For each of
them, we can consider two attempts to reduce possibility of nonexistent objects to facts
about existent objects and substantial properties.
7 Crane’s pleonastic properties significantly overlap with Meinogians’ ‘extranuclear’ properties (see footnote
1). Being fictional, being mythical, being nonexistent and being represented by someone are pleonastic for
Crane and all of them are categorized as extranuclear properties in Parsons (1980). If being possible is
pleonastic for Crane, then this is also a positive exemplar of the overlap in question. (The property of being
existent might be an exception: it is extranuclear for Meinongians, but Crane might take it as substantial). If
Crane’s distinction between substantial and pleonastic properties is not ad hoc and has its own justification,
some Meinongians may divert this distinction to justify their distinction between nuclear and extranuclear
properties. Therefore, if, as Crane claims, the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear properties is ad hoc
and not justifiable, then the distinction between substantial and pleonastic properties will be ad hoc as well.
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The first attempt appeals to possible worlds. According to this account, ‘some
existent object is such that it is possibly a winged pig’ is true (in this actual world)
iff there is a possible world where an object is a winged pig and it is (a counterpart of)
some existent object in the actual world (for simplicity, accessibility is ignored here).
On the basis of this biconditional, one may take the possible worlds to be (at least a part
of) the truth-maker of a sentence which predicates possibility to a nonexistent object.
Then, what are possible worlds? Again, at least two accounts are available: Lewis’
modal realism and actualism. On the one hand, Lewisian possible worlds are existent,
but it is hard to count them as a part of what Crane counts as reality. On the other hand,
actualism claims that possible worlds are some composites of abstracts in this actual
world. This view seems compatible with Crane’s reductionism. Given these consider-
ations, reductionism may claim that the truth-maker of the sentence ‘a winged pig is
possible’ consists of existent objects and possible worlds as abstract composites of
things in the actual world. (Of course, it is well known that this actualist attempt to
reduce possible worlds to the actual one is far from being unproblematic (cf. Lewis
1986, pp. 150–165). Thus, if we run together reductionism and actualism, we can, at
least, say that the former faces the same problem of the latter.)
The second attempt goes as follows. First, it supposes that the modal properties of
the form being able to be such and such are substantial properties of existent objects.
Then, the truths of the statements in question (‘some existent object is such that it is
possibly a winged pig’ and ‘a winged pig is possible’) are explained by the fact that
some existent objects instantiate these properties. According to this attempt, the truth-
maker of the sentence ‘a winged pig is possible’ consists of existent objects and (their
instantiation of) certain modal properties as substantial properties.
Both attempts may work for sentences of the form ‘an/some F is possible’, given the
supposed equivalence of ‘an F is possible’ with ‘some existent object is such that it is
possible to be F’. However, it is not clear how other forms of sentences which predicate
possibility of nonexistent objects can be reductively explained in a similar manner. For
example, is a simple sentence like ‘Pegasus is possible’ reductively explained in this
way? There seems to be two ways to do so. The first one is to claim that ‘Pegasus is
possible’ is true iff some existent object is able to be Pegasus. But, identity is necessary
and no existent object is Pegasus, therefore no existent object can be Pegasus. The
second way is to claim that assuming that the name ‘Pegasus’ can be replaced by a
suitable definite description, ‘the φ’, ‘Pegasus is possible’ is true iff ‘some existent
object is able to be uniquely φ’ is true. The result of this proposal depends on how we
specify φ. One may regard φ as being described as such and such in the Greek myth.
An apparent problem of this option is that it fails to appropriately distinguish between
possible and impossible objects. For example, let us consider the box described in the
short story ‘Sylvan’s Box’ (Priest 2005, sec. 6.6). According to the story, the box is
empty, but not empty as well—a small figure is in it, and not. Intuitively, the box is
impossible. Now, along the line of the present option, the box is possible iff some
existent object is able to be uniquely described as being empty and not empty in
‘Sylvan’s Box’. However, it may be the case that the story describes a fictional story
about the actual box (as War and Peace is a fictional story about Napoleon). In this
case, according to the present option, the box is possible. This contradicts our intuition.
Of course, this problem is easily avoided by adding the consistency of the description to
the right-hand side of the biconditional. However, even if this revision is made, the
Philosophia (2016) 44:423–434 429
following problem will remain. It is quite unclear whether some existent object is
actually able to be uniquely described as a winged horse in the Greek myth. Maybe
some horses which existed in ancient Greece were able to be described as a winged
horse in the Greek myth, but it is hard to see which one was uniquely so. The second
option is to take φ as being a winged horse with the properties which the Greek myth
ascribes to Pegasus. Again, we are quite unsure whether some existent object is
actually able to be uniquely such a winged horse. Which object can be the unique
winged horse with the properties ascribed by the Greek myth to Pegasus? Some
existent horses? You? We think there is no definite answer.
Reductionism tries to avoid these problems by claiming that the truth-makers of
sentences which predicate possibility to nonexistent objects contain neither nonexistent
nor existent objects at all. In particular, a reductionist may try to explain the truths of
such sentences by consistency of substantial properties. Let us label this position the
no-object approach. For example, according to the no-object approach, ‘a winged pig is
possible’ is made true by the fact that the property of being winged and the property of
being a pig are consistent. Since no existent objects nor instantiation of any kind of
properties are involved in truth-making of the sentence, the problems described above
disappear. However, once we consider several quantificational sentences about nonex-
istent objects and the inferential relation among them, it turns out that the no-object
approach is not available for reductionists. Moreover, such consideration reveals
another problem of reductionism concerning quantifications. These problems will be
discussed in the next section.
2.2 Are all Quantifications over Nonexistent Objects Reducible?
Consider the following statements:
(3)
a. A winged pig is possible.
b. Most winged pigs are possible.
c. Every winged pig is possible.
At least for someone like Crane who takes quantification over nonexistent objects in
natural languages at face value, these sentences are not equivalent and thus must have
different truth-makers, if they have any. Any attempt to take such quantification over
nonexistent objects as genuine must be sensitive to these differences. Then, how can a
reductionist distinguish the truth conditions of them, within the framework of the no-
object approach, which appeals to the consistency of a set of properties?
Given the no-object approach, the following may be a suggestion. Suppose that S is
the set of all sets of substantial properties which contain both the property of being
winged and the property of being a pig. (3a) is true iff there is a consistent set in S. (3b)
is true iff more than half of the members of S are consistent. (3c) is true iff all members
of S are consistent. These truth conditions give us the following predictions (given
|S| > 2): (3c) entails (3b), (3b) entails (3a), but not vice versa. This seems correct, if the
quantifiers behave with respect to nonexistent objects in the same way as they do with
respect to existent ones.
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However, this suggestion is silent on the reason why the facts about sets of
properties can be the truth-makers of such quantificational sentences about nonexistent
objects. The only possible reply is that, between such sets and nonexistent objects, there
is some relation responsible for this. But, then, which is this relation? An obvious
answer to this question is that sets of substantial properties are properties of (existent or
nonexistent) objects. However, once a reductionist accepts this connection between
nonexistent objects and sets of substantial properties, she needs to abandon the claim
that nonexistent objects can have only pleonastic properties. As we have seen, for
something to be possible, it needs not to be represented as having properties. Thus, the
required relation between properties and objects should not depend on representations.
A substantial property is a property of an object x in the required sense, only if x
representation-independently has the properties. And this leads to abandon reduction-
ism, since if nonexistent objects can have substantial properties, they should be able to
do truth-making in the same way as existent objects do truth-making, given that
existent objects make true sentences about them by instantiating some substantial
properties. Therefore, the reductionist should not employ the no-object approach.
Our argument so far relies on the claim that the property of being possible is not
representation-dependent. This is plausible, given the reasons we already stated in
section 2.1: for example, the Empire State Building, an actually existent object, would
be possible even if no one had ever thought about it. However, a reductionist may insist
on the claim that the property of being possible is representation-dependent and, as we
suggested in section 2.1, a winged pig is possible because it is represented as having
consistent properties. More specifically, to connect nonexistent objects and (sets of)
substantial properties, a reductionist may propose (5) as the semantic analysis of (3),
given (4):
(4) x is possible iff x is represented as being φ, where φ is consistent, for some
appropriate φ.
(5)
a. For some x, x is represented as being φ, where φ is a conjunction of properties
among which is the property of being a winged pig, and x is possible.
b. More than half of things represented as being φ, where φ is a conjunction of
properties among which is the property of being a winged pig, are possible.
c. For every x, if x is represented as being φ, where φ is a conjunction of properties
among which is the property of being a winged pig, then x is possible.
First of all, proponents of this view must give a reductionist account of the truth of
the right-hand side of (4), in particular, the truth of ‘x is represented as φ’, where x is a
nonexistent object. For the sake of argument, let us assume that some appropriate
reductionist account for it is available. Then, (5) seems to correctly predict inferential
relation among (3). This is good news for reductionists. If so, besides the problem we
have stated, what’s wrong about this proposal? This reductionist account of quantifi-
cational sentences predicating possibility to objects has wrong results about their truth
conditions. Consider the sentence ‘some perpetual motion machine is possible’. This
sentence is false. Indeed, every perpetual motion machine is impossible, given the law
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of physics. Now, imagine that the first steam engine in the history is a perpetual motion
machine. Of course, this imagined story is false, but it is the case that the existent
engine is represented as being a perpetual motion machine in the story. Now, since the
engine is an existent object, it is possible. Thus, the first steam engine, which is
represented as being a perpetual motion machine, is possible. Therefore, according to
the reductionist analysis, ‘some perpetual motion machine is possible’ is true. To avoid
this result, a reductionist may claim that the first steam engine is impossible. (Indeed, if
we assume that ‘being a perpetual motion machine’ is the appropriate φ for the first
steam engine, (4) tells us that, when the steam engine is represented as being a
perpetual motion machine, it is not possible.) However, this is too much even for
reductionists who stick with the representation-dependency of possibility.
Reductionism also has difficulty in giving an explanation of truths of quantifica-
tional negative existential sentences like ‘some winged pig does not exist’. As we have
seen, weak Meinongianism, which takes quantification over nonexistent objects at face
value, claims that this sentence is true iff for some x (in the domain of discourse), x is a
winged pig and it does not exist. Here a problem arises. According to reductionism, the
property of being winged and the property of being a pig are substantial properties and,
thus, only existent objects can instantiate them. From this, it follows that the right-hand
side of the equation is never true. Therefore, according to reductionism, ‘some winged
pig does not exist’ is false, and therefore ‘all winged pigs exist’ is true. But the former is
true and the latter is false.
A reductionist might reply by claiming that we do not need to specify the truth-
makers of quantificational (positive/negative) existential statements in this way. There
can be other ways to specify their truth-makers which predict the correct truth condi-
tions. Indeed, the reductionist could claim that the truth-maker of ‘some winged pig
does not exist’ is the whole world, in particular, the fact that no existent object in the
world instantiates both the substantial properties of being a pig and having wings at the
same time. Any other forms of negative existential states may be understood in this
way: they are made true by the fact that no existent object in the world is such and such.
However, this is incorrect. In particular, this proposal leaves inferential behaviors of
such sentences unexplained. For example, if we take the quantification over nonexistent
objects seriously ‘some winged pig does not exist’ is not equivalent with ‘three winged
pigs do not exist’. But, if the proposal is correct, they have the same truth-maker, that is,
the whole world, and, thus, are equivalent. Moreover, if the reductionist appeals to sets
of substantial properties to capture the semantic relations between them, the same
problem mentioned before arises.
A reductionist may hold that quantificational negative existential statements are
representational dependent by claiming that, for example, ‘every winged pig does not
exist’ is true iff everything which is represented as being a winged pig (and being such
and such) does not exist. However, this again gives a wrong prediction. We can imagine
a fictional story about an existent actual pig according to which it is a winged pig.
Given such a fictional story, the alleged representation-dependent analysis of negative
existential sentences predicts that ‘every winged pig does not exist’ is false.
Not surprisingly, strong Meinongianism does not suffer these problems. This is
because it admits that nonexistent objects can contribute to truth-making. For instance,
consider strong Meinongians à la Parsons. Since the property of being winged and the
property of being a pig are nuclear properties, his version of CP ensures that the domain
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of discourse contains a bunch of winged pigs. Further more, let us define x’s being
possible by the consistency of properties which x instantiates. Then, the truth of (3a) ‘a
winged pig is possible’ could be simply explained by appealing to the fact that some
nonexistent object has the property of being a pig, being winged and the property of
being possible. Secondly, according to this position, (3b) ‘most winged pigs are
possible’ is true iff more than half of the members of the set of all winged pigs are
possible. Finally, the sentence (3c) ‘every winged pig is possible’ is true iff all the
members of the set of all winged pigs are possible. And these truth conditions correctly
predict the entailment relations among (3a), (3b) and (3c), given that the set of all
winged pigs contains more than two pigs. The truth conditions of quantificational
negative existential statements are explained in the similar manner.
3. Conclusion
The present paper has shown the following: first, it is difficult to reductively explain the
instantiation of the property of being possible by nonexistent objects. Secondly, there is
a serious tension between admitting quantification over nonexistent objects, on the one
hand, and the reductionist approach which tries to eliminate nonexistent objects from
truth-making, on the other hand. If the reductionism is abandoned, and only the
reductionism is weak Meinongianism, there seems to be only two options. The first
one is to adopt strong Meinongianism by admitting truth-making by nonexistent
objects. The second option is to abandon Meinongianism altogether by rejecting
genuine reference to and quantification over nonexistent objects. In short, if reduction-
ism is the only option for weak Meinongianism, then to be a strong Meinongian, or not
to be a Meinongian at all - this is the question.8
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